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CASE NO. 18256 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
MAPLETON IRRIGATION CANAL COMPANY 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action for negligent flooding of respondents' 
property. The court entered judgment on a jury finding that 
appellants were negligent and the sole and proximate cause of 
all of the damage. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment entered on the 
grounds that the wrong standards of law were applied by the 
court and the jury finding is not supported by the evidence 
and facts. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Mapleton Irrigation Canal Company is a nonprofit 
corporation. (TR 504)* that provides irrigation water to its 
shareholders and derives its income by assessing shareholders for 
the use of water. Appellant receives its water principally from 
the Strawberry Reservoir with diversion dams in Hobble Creek 
Canyon. The water flows down a main canal with turnouts to 
approximately twenty-seven lateral canals. From each of the 
lateral canals there are approximately twelve to fifteen branch 
ditches or sublaterals which service the individual home owners 
and farmers. Locks are placed on the headgates from the 
Strawberry and Hobble Creek turnouts into the lateral ditch known 
as the Fullmer. TR_22...Q_. There are approximately two hundred 
branch ditches with some two thousand privately owned dams or 
turnouts. 
Water is diverted from the main canal and laterals by a 
water master. When water is turned down a lateral ditch into a 
sublateral, the water master notifies the user at the head of the 
ditch that the water is coming and that they will be allocated a 
certain amount of water. Each individual then notifies the next 
person that the water is coming down the sublateral or branch 
ditch. Water is diverted from branch ditch onto individual 
properties by headgates installed and maintained by individual 
*(All references to the District Court file are designated "TR" 
with the page number following). 
? 
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shareholders. Each person, as his turn arrives, removes the 
headgate to allow the water onto his property and inserts his 
headgate into the main flow of the branch ditch, thereby turning 
out the water onto his property for the period of time that he is 
entitled. (TR 308). So long as the headgates to the individual 
property owners are in their normal place, the water flows down 
the branch ditch, passed the property and out into a drainage 
area that absorbs all waste water. 
Appellants have a policy and practice of requiring that 
headgates diverting water out of branch ditches be kept out of 
the ditch in the event waste water or irrigation water 
unexpectedly comes down those ditches. (TR 507,508). The 
shareholders at annual meetings have been advised to keep their 
headgates out of said branch ditches, (TR 508), and assessed 
penalties if they do not. (TR 308) The flow of water down the 
canals is not constant and varies considerably. (TR 285 & 506). 
Respondents as shareholders participated in and utilized 
appellants' system for eleven years preceding the accident, and 
accordingly had diverted the water during their time and then 
passed it on down to subsequent users, (TR 196, 203). 
Respondents owned their own headgate and put it in themselves. 
(TR 240). Respondents were aware of appellants' policy and agreed 
that that was a policy that had been pursued over the years. (TR 
257). 
On August 24, 1979, respondents were the last users of the 
water in the sublateral or branch ditch, and when the watering 
turn ended and the water ceased to flow respondents did not pull 
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out their headgates which left a continuing dam or blockage to 
any water coming down the sublateral ditch (TR 330). 
Respondents' watering turn ended and the water ceased to flow at 
approximately 4:30 p.m. Sometime in the middle of the night, 
some amount of water came down the lateral ditch, was diverted by 
respondents' headgate onto respondents' property, thereby 
flooding the property, causing damage to the home, personal 
effects and property of respondents. 
Respondents admitted that had the headgate been removed they 
would not have been floo~ed. (TR 250, 254). The testimony of 
Mr. Bigler on cross examination at TR 250, line 7 provides: 
"Question. On the 24th day of August you took the 
water. The water came to you and your boy took it. 
He put the headgate in. And then you left and went 
to work and your wife went to a function of some sort, 
and the dam was not taken out, was it? 
"Answer: No. 
"Question. If the dam had been removed as you had done 
for nine years other than about three times, you would 
not have been flooded, would you? 
' 'Answer. No." 
There was also testimony that water may unexpectedly be in 
the ditch if someone downstream asked for it. (TR 521). In fact, 
Mr. Mayberry, a user downstream, said he could always use all 
excess water on his hay field where the water only runs about 
one-third the distance down. (TR 535). 
Respondents commenced an action in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court alleging negligence and seeking monetary damages. 
!i 
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The matter was tried to a jury and a special verdict was rendered 
finding appellants negligent and the sole and pr~ximate cause of 
all damage. No allocation of cause or negligence was attributed 
by the jury to respondents. Judgment was entered against 
appellants in the amount of $8,361.70 plus costs of $363.10. A 
cash bond of $300.00 has been posted with the court and 
subsequently a supersedeas bond in the amount of $8,361.70 was 
filed with the court. 
Appellants take no issue with the dollar amount of damages 
found by the jury, but only dispute (1) the standard of legal 
liability imposed by the court and relied upon by the jury and 




THE JURY DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE COURT 
IMPROPERLY IMPOSED A HIGHER STANDARD OF CARE ON APPELLANTS BY 
GIVING JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 8, THAN REQUIRED BY UTAH LAW. 
Appellants particularly take exception to Instruction No. 8 
given to the jury (TR 571) because it imposes a higher standard 
of care upon appellants, than required by Utah law. 
The court stated that it was the duty of appellant to: 
"No. 3. To use reasonable care in knowing where the water 
is in its irrigation system to prevent same from flowing 
into ditches where users are not on notice of its presence, 
or expectation in such ditch." 
Appellants submit that there is no case law or statutory law 
in the State of Utah that requires appellants to know where the 
water is in all of its sublateral or branch ditches at all times. 
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The law only requires that appellants use ordinary care in the 
construction, maintenance and operation of its ditches so as to 
prevent any damage or injury to the property of others. See UCA 
73-1-18; McKay!:.. Breeze, 72 Utah 305, 310, 269 Pac. 1026 (1928) 
and cases cited therein. 
Even though the above instruction is couched in terms of 
"to use reasonable care in knowing .•• " the standard is vague 
enough that it implies appellant must know at all times and at 
all places and under all circumstances where the water is. In 
this case it means knowing there was water in a ditch in the 
middle of the night. By charging appellants with the duty to 
know where all water is in its sublateral ditches at all times 
imposes strict liability upon appellants. 
I n the an c i en t ca s e o f f.1~!££~£. v • .Rz!~!!~~, 
LR 3 HL 330, 1 Eng Rul Cas 256 (1868), the doctrine of strict 
liability was first enunciated wherein the owner of a mill built 
a reservoir and when the reservoir was partially filled with 
water, the dam broke through into old mine workings under the 
site of the reservoir, of whose existence the defendant was 
ignorant, and thence into the mines resulting in heavy loss. The 
House of Lords held: 
"We think that the true rule of law is that the person, 
who for his own purposes, brings on his land and collects 
and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it 
escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does 
not do so he is prima facie answerable for all the 
damage which is a natural consequence of its escape." 
The court in Rylands subsequently modified the liability for 
a n y " n o n n a t u r a 1 " u s e o f t h e 1 a n d • 1.£!.9..:. N o e v i d e n c e w a s 
presented at the trial in the present case as to the source of 
6 
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the water that came down the ditch in the middle of the night 
that was diverted by respondent onto his property causing the 
damage. The water could have been waste water that was otherwise 
draining off over-saturated ground and flowing back into the 
ditches. In Brian~ Fre!!!ont Irrigation Company, 112 Utah 220, 
186 P2d 588 (1947), this court held that since Utah is one of the 
arid states and conservation of water is of the utmost importance 
to the public welfare: 
" •.• To waste water is to injure that welfare, and it 
is therefore the duty of the user of water to return 
surplus or waste water into the stream from which 
it was taken so that further use can be made by 
others." Citing Kinney on Irrigation and Water 
Rights, Second Edition, Section 912, pages 1614-1616, 
at page 590. 
The court in Brian noted that the channels served as natural 
drainage for the waters in the area, and therefore denied 
plaintiff's cause of action for waste water flowing back into a 
canal upstream from plaintiff, which overflooded and damaged 
plaintiff's property. 
Since the water in the present case came unexpectedly during 
the night, the source seems of primary importance. Other sources 
of excess water that may have been in the sublateral ditch that 
evening could include flash flooding from heavy rainfall. See 
Jordan:!._:._ _t!ount Pleasant, 15 Utah 449, which holds, among other 
things, that companies are not liable for unlooked for or 
overwhelming displays of power, such as storms, but they may be 
required to meet weather emergencies that may be reasonably 
expected. No evidence was presented as to the weather and the 
potential for flash flooding. 
Other excess waters could have come from percolating or 
7 
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subsurface waters, or mountain runoff, or regular irrigation 
company water. In any event, the absence of such evidence 
showing the source or the nature of the water causing the damage, 
except that "it was present" imposes a strict liability standard 
on appellant. This prevents appellant from exercising ordinary 
care, because appellant is liable whether reasonable care is 
exercised or not and whether he knew about the water or not. 
In ~£!~Z ~ ~~~~~~ ~~£~~' this court held that no 
negligence was shown that defendant failed to prevent seepage and 
flood damage to plaintiff when constructing a new irrigation 
ditch through otherwise very porous soil. The court in McKay, 
expressly rejected the doctrine of strict liability set forth in 
Fletcher !:_, Ryland, supra probably in furtherance of a public 
policy of encouraging private irrigation companies to meet the 
water needs of agricultural communities by imposing less 
stringent standards of care. 
Appellant submits that it would be unwise to now impose 
strict liability on shareholder irrigation companies for the 
following additional policy reasons: 
(1) There are some two hundred sublateral or branch ditches 
in appellants' system and about two thousand individual dams or 
turnouts, constructed and owned by individual property owners. 
Public policy would better be served by leaving the determination 
of responsibility for flooding and damage to the shareholders of 
the company. Here the shareholders annually approve a practice 
of imposing a financial penalty on individuals who leave their 
diversion headgates in the branch ditch. To hold appellant 
A 
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liable in this case, defeats that self determination and imposes 
a legal requirement that the water master personally walk down 
each ditch every time to insure all two thousand headgates are 
properly situated before any water is turned down the ditch, with 
the company bearing the responsibility for failure to do so. 
(2) Individual property owners are in a better position to 
police and maintain their diversion dams in situations where 
children are mischievous or playful in daming a branch ditch to 
swim or float boats, etc. Parents can better handle their 
children than the water master can. 
(3) To hold appellant strictly liable creates a situation 
where individual farmers, who have suffered crop failure or 
financial loss, could simply leave their dams in the branch ditch 
in the middle of the night hoping to catch some water and then 
seek restitution for damage to their property from the irrigation 
company. 
(4) The laws in Utah ought to support private irrigation 
companies providing low cost irrigation water to agriculture 
communities. Appellant as a non-profit corporation seeks only to 
meet expenses and not make a profit. Higher standards of legal 
care impose higher costs and would force the company to seek 
governmental subsidies through taxation. Appellant submits that 
to impose strict liability of requiring appellants to know where 
any and all water is at all times is not in the best interests of 
the parties or the people of the state of Utah and is a 
legislative decision. 
A second point regarding Instruction No. 8 that merits 
consideration is that even if appellants are held strictly liable 
q 
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to know where all water is in all their sublateral ditches at all 
times, appellants submit it is not the law in the state of Utah 
that notice be given to all property owners when water is passing 
through the sublateral ditch to another location. In the case of 
Anderson v. Pleasant Grove Irrigation Co_!!!pany, 26 Utah 2d 420, 
490 P2d 897 (1971), this court held that an irrigation company 
could not escape liability on the theory that the duty to see 
where the water went after receiving notice of their turn was on 
the shareholder. In Anderson the ·facts were substantially 
different from the present case, in that a non-user had 
previously notified the ·irrigation company of the potential for 
flooding and had asked the irrigation company to exercise care in 
seeing that any water passing through his land would not 
overflow. The irrigation company then having been put on notice 
failed to take such reasonable care to prevent the flooding and 
damage to the shareholders' property. The court in Anderson 
never imposed a duty on the irrigation company to notify the 
plaintiff every time that water would be flowing through or 
passed his premises. Appellant submits that no case heretofore 
decided in the State of Utah has imposed an obligation on any 
irrigation company to notify individual property owners when 
water is passing through a sublateral or branch ditch on their 
property. In fact, legal counsel for respondents argued that the 
failure to provide this notice in the middle of the night by 
appellants was the cause of the damage and constituted negligence 
under Utah law, which was an improper statement of Utah State 
Law. ( See Transcript at pages TR 576, 577, 579, 580, 582, 
10 
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583,606, 607.) From the facts illicited at the trial, 
respondents readily admitted that had they not left their 
headgate in, thereby turning the water out onto their property 
and had the headgate been removed as they had done for the 
preceding nine years, other than about three times, the property 
would not have been flooded. (TR 250). The Utah Legislature has 
spoken rather forcibly on the subject that any individual 
diverting water from its water course, except to prevent damage 
to private property, is acting contrary to Utah State Law and is 
guilty of a misdemeanor and is subject to damages and ·costs. UCA 
73-1-15 provides: 
"Obstructing canals or other water courses-penalties. 
Whenever any person,--Partnership company or corporation 
has a right of way of any established type or title for 
any canal or other water course, it shall be unlawful 
for any person, persons, or government agencies to 
place or maintain in place any obstruction or change 
of the water flow by fence or otherwise along or across 
or in such canal or water course, except as where said 
water course inflicts damage to private proper~y, 
without first receiving written permission for the 
change and providing gates sufficient for the passage 
of the owner or owners of such canal or water course. 
That the vested rights in the established canals and 
and water course shall be protected against all 
encroachment. That indemnifying agreements may be 
entered as may be just and proper by governmental 
agencies. Any person, partnership company or 
corporation violating the provisions of this 
section is guilty of a misdemeanor and is subject 
to damages and costs." 
Appellant submits that "other water course" within the meaning of 
the above statute, applies to all lateral, sublateral and branch 
ditches of irrigation companies. Appellants believe that one of 
the reasons why the headgate was left in the sublateral ditch by 
respondents was to turn any excess water onto their property. 
Appellants submit that the court applied the wrong standard 
1 1 
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of law imposjng strict liability upon them for all water going 
down sublateral or branch ditches, whether or not they had notice 
of said water and regardless of the source of said water. 
Furthermore, respondents' intervening act which diverted the 
water from the sublateral onto its property, violated statutory 
law and company policy and procedures. The water otherwise would 
have gone down the sublateral into the drainage area, causing no 
injury to anyone. 
POINT II 
THE JURY FINDING OF ONE HUNDRED PERCENT NEGLIGENCE ON THE 
PART OF APPELLANTS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY SUBSTANTIAL OR 
REASONABLE EVIDENCE AND AS SUCH SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
This court in Erickson Y..:_ Bennion, 28 U2d 371, 503 P 2d 139 
(1972), reiterated the general standard of appellant review of 
not upsetting a finding by a jury if any reasonable or 
substantial basis exists to support it. In Erickson, the court 
held that plaintiff's contributory negligence in having a 
driveway built without a culvert caused his own damage by 
diverting defendant's irrigation water onto his property. 
Appellants submit that respondents in the pesent case failed to 
present any compelling or substantial evidence upon which a jury 
could rely, establishing that appellants were negligent in the 
operation of the sublateral or branch ditches. No evidence was 
presented that appellants failed to repair or maintain their 
ditches. In fact the ditches are in good operating order, do not 
allow seepage and are adequate for the normal flow of water. The 
dam gate where the problem arose belongs to respondent (TR 240) 
and is built out of concrete with a firm plywood board being 
12 
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inserted in the grooves that sufficiently turns the water out of 
the lateral ditch onto respondents' property. See Exhibit No. 
12. No evidence was ever presented that the sublateral or branch 
ditches were improperly constructed or that the dykes, dams or 
turnouts were improperly constructed. 
No evidence was presented by respondents that the failure to 
lock up a headgate on the main ditch or lateral ditch on any 
g i v en o cc as _i on was t he cause of the damage to res pond en ts • The 
testimony of the water master, Doc Snow, (Transcript page 27 line 
10 through 13) indicated that it was his job to check and make 
sure that the locks on those headgates on the distribution system 
were in good repair. In fact, in testimony set forth in the 
deposition of Doc Snow (Deposition of Louis Snow-page 5-which was 
published) (TR 226-227) information was provided that appellants 
always kept the main canals locked and he kept them locked up. 
From the transcript of proceedings, no mention was made of any 
failure to keep the main canals locked up. The only possible 
evidence was a hearsay statement testified to by Mr. Bogardus 
(Transcript, ·page 265, line 17 through 20) to the effect that Mr. 
Bleggi indicated to the water master that "the gate should be 
chained and locked". However, it appears from the transcript of 
the proceedings that no evidence was ever presented or offered, 
which would indicate that the failure to keep the gate chained 
and locked was the direct cause of the harm to respondents. In 
fact, no evidence was ever presented as to the source of the 
water, whether it was from rain, flooding, runoff from over-
saturated land, percolation, or diver~ion by other indi~iduals of 
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water into the sublateral ditches. Appellants submit that there 
is not any substantial evidence upon which a jury could rely in 
finding negligence attributable to appellants as to the lockups 
of the main canals, laterals, sublaterals, or branch ditches 
where the incident occurred. 
Respondents did allege that the system of taking turns, 
followed by appellants over the past fourteen years, and of 
notifying the individual at the head of a sublateral ditch who 
then notifies the next person down the line, constituted 
negligence. Respondent Bigler testified that he has operated 
under such system for approximately eleven years. (TR 196) 
Respondent also testified that he has read the statement of 
policy of appellants' irrigation company and agrees that it is 
the policy that irrigation company pursues. (TR 257) Another 
witness for respondent, Donald Bogardus also testified that he 
was acquainted with appellants' policy on notification (TR 266-
267) and furthermore testified that he knew if he left his 
headgate in very long, he would get flooded. Mr. Bogardus stated 
at TR 267 lines 15 through 19: 
"Question: And if you left your headgate in very long, 
you may get flooded, is that correct? 
"Answer: Yes, I knew that I wouldn't know when the 
water was coming in the ditch, so I always left the 
headgate out." 
Appellants offered testimony (at TR 308) that the users 
themselves agreed to notify each other down the line when water 
was coming and when their headgate should be removed to allow the 
water to flow down the sublateral ditch. It had been the 
14 
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established policy of appellants' irrigation company for the last 
fourteen years and, in fact, at annual meetings the policy was 
announced and discussed. (TR 507, 511, 553) Appellants 
attempted to introduce evidence as to the custom and common usage 
of following such procedure throughout Utah County by the various 
irrigation companies, which proffer of evidence was refused by 
the court and which the jury never had the opportunity to 
consider. (TR 566-67). The proffer would have set forth the so 
called "turn system" such as the Springville System which allows 
each user. to take his turn and thereby imposing an obligation 
upon the water users to open and close their own gates and notify 
the next ones in line that the water was available. Appellants 
submit that should this court conclude that the notification or 
"turn system" employed by appellants constituted negligence in 
this case, then appellants should have been given the opportunity 
to present evidence on the common usage and practice in the state 
and community, together with the reasons and history for such 
use. The failure to allow evidence on this point is reversable 
error. 
One additional area which is misunderstood may have unduly 
influenced the jury. For some unexplained reason the water 
master's records for the month in question were missing from his 
book. This disappearance is not substantial evidence upon which 
a jury could rely to find that appellant was negligent in the 
operation of its irrigation system. Under the irrigation company 
rules, an individual can only receive so much water as he is 
entitled to evidenced by his shares or ownership in the 
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irrigation company. Each share receives only so much cubic feet 
of water. The water master's records, although not the best, do 
indicate the number of hours that an individual receives water on 
any given day. The date of August 24, 1979, when the accident 
occurred, was at or near the end of the watering season. From 
the records at the end of the year, it could be established the 
amount of water that each shareholder received. If any 
shareholder received more water than his shares entitled him to 
he would be liable to the company for such excess water. It is 
unfortunate, but .appellants b'eli eve, because of this fact, some 
shareholder in the system obtained and tore out the pages of the 
water master's book in order to conceal the fact that he received 
more water than he was entitled to. No evidence was ever 
presented by any of the parties that the water master or the 
officers and directors of appellant irrigation company themselves 
destroyed the records, nor did they in any way consent to the 
destruction of records by individuals known to them. If the jury 
relied upon the torn out records to find negligence on the part 
of appellant, then said evidence is insufficient to warrant a 
finding of negligence or causation by appellants. 
The only evidence presented was that during the night some 
unknown amount of water from some unknown source, came done one 
of 200 branch ditches, and was diverted by respondents headgates 
onto the property causing the damage. The headgate should have 
been removed to allow the water to flow by harmlessly. 
Excluding the hearsay statement of Mr. Bleggi, and 
disregarding the fact that daily records were missing, there is 
no evidence of negligence other than water was present in the 
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branch ditch that night. Appellants submit the evidence is 
insufficient to substantiate the jury verdict. 
POINT III 
THE JURY'S FINDING OF NO CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE BY 
RESPONDENTS IS NOT SUBSTANTIATED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Respondents testified that had they removed their headgate 
they would not have been flooded or damaged. The testimony of 
Mr. Bigler on cross examination at TR 250, line 7 provides: 
"Question: On the 24th day of August, you took the 
water. The water came to you and your boy took it. 
He put the headgate in. And then you left and went 
to work and your wife went to a function of some · 
sort and the dam was not taken out, was it? 
"Answer: No." 
"Question: If the dam had been removed as you had done 
for nine years, other than about three times, you would 
not have been flooded, would you? 
"Answer: No." 
Another witness for respondent, Mr. Bogardus testified that 
he knew that if he left his headgate in that the water would be 
turned onto his property, and he would be flooded. (TR 267 line 
15). Appellants do not dispute the testimony of respondents in 
this regard that had they removed their dam, they would not have 
been flooded. Appellants do submit that it was foreseeable that 
water could possibly come down the ditch. Appellants presented 
testimony of Mr. Mayberry, a party further down the line on the 
sublateral or branch ditch, that he could always use any excess 
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water. Mr. Mayberry stated at TR 534-535 beginning at line 17: 
"Question: Do you have any knowledge, Mr. Mayberry, 
as to whether any water has come down that ditch, 
other than on scheduled times when you were taking 
the water? 
"Answer: I can't pinpoint a definite time, but I 
imagine there was about a half-a-dozen times that 
we had waste water come down the ditch. We welcomes 
sic it, because the water over there is very rare 
and very scarce in that ditch. 
"Question: Let me ask you this: Are you or are you 
not short of water, then? 
"Answer: Well, we don't have too much, that's true. 
"Question: And you have stated that you welcomed 
the water, is that correct? 
"Answer: That's right." 
Appellants submit that the jury finding of no contributory 
negligence on the part of respondents is wrong and is not 
supported by the . evidence presented. See generally UCA 78-27-37, 
Rigtrup !..!. Stra~be£.!.1. ~ater Users Association, 563 P2d 1247 
(1977). 
·CONCLUSION 
Appellants submit that the decision and judgment of the 
lower court should be reversed because: 
1. The court applied the wrong standard of law in its jury 
instructions, which was tantamount to imposing strict liability 
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on appellant irrigation company for any and all water found in 
its sublateral or branch ditches. Furthermore, charging 
appellants with the knowledge of said water and requiring them 
to give notice to everyone that said water is passing by or 
through their property in said sublateral ditch at all times is 
contrary to the law heretofore established in Utah. 
2. No substantial or reasonable evidence was presented to 
the jury setting forth negligence in the operation, care and 
maintenance of said ditches, nor demonstrating that appellant 
violated any duty of care to respondents. 
3. The jury was wrong in finding no contributory negligence 
by respondents, based upon respondents' own testimony that _the 
flooding and damage would have been avoided had respondent 
removed the headgate from the ditch after his· watering turn, 
which respondent had the opportunity to do, but failed to do. 
The judgment of the District Court should be vacated and the 
matter should be remanded back to the District Court for a trial 
applying the proper standards o law in the State of Utah. 
DATED this 2/- day of 2. 
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